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Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 , 2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , 2010 , 2011.

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May 12th & 13th, 2008

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Prison Litigation Reform Act / 1983 claims
- Habeas Petition / Miranda / Confrontation Clause
- Antitrust Law / Due Process Claim
- Immigration / Visa Petition
- False Claims Act / Whistleblowing
 

Ohio Supreme Court
 
No Opinions.
 
First District Court of Appeals
[Search Other Ohio Districts]
 
No Opinions.
 
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases
 
No Opinions.
 
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases
 
Harden-Bey v. Rutter (May 12, 2008)(Appeal from W.D. MI)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0176p-06.pdf
-  Cary Harden-Bey, an incarcerated pro se litigant, challenges the dismissal under § 1997e(c) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), of his § 1983 claims against several employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Because Harden-Bey has stated a cognizable due-process claim, we reverse that part of the district court's order. And because he has failed to state a cognizable cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim under the Eighth (and Fourteenth) Amendment or a cognizable equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the remaining parts of the district court's order.
 
Jackson v. McKee (May 12, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. MI)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0177p-06.pdf
-  A state court jury convicted Roy Jackson of felony murder, armed robbery and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the felony-murder and firearm convictions and reversed the armed-robbery conviction. In reaching these conclusions, the state court denied Jackson's claims that his confession was involuntary, that his Miranda waiver was not knowing or intelligent and that the admission of nontestimonial hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause. Because the state court decisions were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, we affirm the district court's denial of Jackson's habeas petition.
 
S&M Brands Inc v. Cooper (May 13, 2008)(Appeal from M.D. TN)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0178p-06.pdf
-  S&M Brands, Inc. and International Tobacco Partners, Ltd. ("ITP") sued the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee in his official capacity.1 They claim that the State of Tennessee has violated federal antitrust law and the U.S. Constitution in its implementation and application of the Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") between various States and major tobacco manufacturers. The only claim before us in this appeal and cross-appeal is whether the Attorney General's enforcement of an amended escrow provision has had an impermissible retroactive effect in violation of the Plaintiffs' rights to due process. The district court concluded that, although ITP is not a tobacco product manufacturer, it had standing to seek a release of funds from escrow. On the merits of the Plaintiffs' due-process claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General except as to ITP's claim for a release of escrow funds associated with cigarette sales in 2003. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand to the district court with instruction to dismiss the case without prejudice on grounds of sovereign immunity.
 
Ukpabi v. Mukasey (May 13, 2008)(Appeal from Board of Immigration Appeals )
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0179p-06.pdf
-  Petitioner, Morgan Ukpabi, seeks review of an order of removal, issued following the denial by the Immigration Judge ("IJ") of Petitioner's request for a continuance to await the outcome of a second Visa Petition ("Form I-130") filed by Petitioner's third wife. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision. Petitioner appeals the IJ's denial of his motion for a continuance and the BIA's summary affirmance. The appeal is not well-taken. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the IJ abused her discretion or that her decision violated either the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or international law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
 
Claudia Marlar v. BWXT Y-12 LLC  (May 13, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. TN)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0180p-06.pdf
-  Ms. Claudia Marlar filed this action against her former employer, BWXT Y-12, L.L.C. ("BWXT"), alleging that it had violated the False Claims Act ("FCA") by defrauding the United States government, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(3), and by discharging her in retaliation for whistleblowing, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The district court held that Ms. Marlar's claim of fraud was not pleaded with specificity, and therefore her cause of action was dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also held that Ms. Marlar failed to allege the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for retaliation, and therefore dismissed her complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Ms. Marlar claims that both determinations are in error. We find that the district court properly dismissed Ms. Marlar's fraud complaint, as Ms. Marlar failed to identify a single false claim and did not establish the specifics of the alleged fraud. We find, however, that Ms. Marlar adequately pleaded a cause of action for retaliation. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's decision, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.