Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 , 2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , 2010 , 2011.

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Nov. 24th & 25th, 2008

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- United States Merit Systems Protection Board / Hatch Act
- Sentencing / Armed Career Criminals Act / Evidence / Reasonable suspicion
- Double Jeopardy
- Establishment Clause Claim / Due Process / Legislative Immunity
- Sentencing / Downward variance
- Subject matter jurisdiction / Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
- Jury Instructions / Evidence / Prejudicial variance
- Bankruptcy / Chp 7 / Technical Abandonment Is Revocable
- Writ of habeas corpus / Ineffective Counsel
- Sentencing / Career-offender provision
- Social Security disability benefits
- Tennessee Human Rights Act
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
  

First District Court of Appeals

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No Opinions.
       

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

Molina-Crespo v. US Merit System (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from N.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0419p-06.pdf
-  Juan Molina-Crespo (“Molina”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”). Molina challenges the district court’s conclusion that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Molina’s violation of 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3), the provision of the Hatch Act that regulates the political activity of state employees who administer federal funds, warranted his removal. Molina also appeals the district court’s rejection of his challenges to the constitutionality of the Act, including attacks based on equal protection, due process, and the First Amendment. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
 
USA v. McCauley (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from S.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0421p-06.pdf
-  Thomas McCauley appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his residence and vehicle, arguing that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that his wife did not validly consent to the search of their residence and vehicle. He further contends that, even if he is convicted, his prior offenses do not subject him to sentencing under the Armed Career Criminals Act. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Upon review we find that reasonable suspicion that appellant was involved in criminal activity supported the stop and that his wife validly consented to a search of his residence and vehicle. Because his prior offenses constitute “occasions different” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), he was properly sentenced under the ACCA. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
 
Klein v. Leis (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from S.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0424p-06.pdf
-  Thomas Klein seeks habeas relief based on an alleged Double Jeopardy violation. Posit: Did the state trial judge fail to exercise “sound discretion” by granting a mistrial without allowing the defendant to argue against the motion? No. In the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial judge exercised the requisite “sound discretion” and affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
      

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Smith v. Jefferson Cnty (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0415p-06.pdf
-  The former principal of Jefferson County, Tennessee’s alternative school and two former teachers at the school (collectively referred to as “the teachers”), allege that, by closing the county’s public alternative school and contracting with Kingswood Academy (“Kingswood”) to provide alternative-school services for public-school students, the Jefferson County School Board of Commissioners and its members (collectively referred to as “the Board”) violated the teachers’ (1) First Amendment Establishment Clause rights under the United States Constitution and similar rights under article I, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution; and (2) procedural and substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The teachers appeal the grant of summary judgment to the Board and its members on all of the teachers’ claims, and the denial of the teachers’ motion for partial summary judgment. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board violated the Establishment Clause. In addition, we hold that the Board did not violate the teachers’ procedural and substantive due-process rights, and that the individual Board members are entitled to legislative immunity. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on the teachers’ Establishment Clause claims and the district court’s denial of legislative immunity to the Board members, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on the teachers’ procedural and substantive due-process claims. Finally, because we hold that the individual Board members are entitled to legislative immunity, we need not address whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.
 
USA v. Presley (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. MI)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0416p-06.pdf
-  Plaintiff-Appellant the United States of America appeals the district court’s resentencing of Defendant-Appellee Keith Presley to 120 months of incarceration, a downward variance from his Guidelines range of 360 months to life. Presley and his co-defendant, Kevin Davis, were found guilty of various counts arising from a drug and money-laundering conspiracy, and both were sentenced to 360 months of incarceration. In United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005), we considered Presley’s and Davis’s appeals of their convictions and sentences. We affirmed Presley’s conviction, but because certain evidence against Davis was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we reversed the district court’s denial of Davis’s motion to suppress and remanded for a determination of whether Davis’s conviction should stand. We vacated both Presley’s and Davis’s sentences and remanded for resentencing in light of Booker. On remand, the district court made a downward variance based on the disparity between Presley’s Guidelines sentence and the 96-month sentence that Davis received pursuant to an agreement with the government. In this appeal, the government argues that the district court erred in reducing Presley’s sentence based on the sentencing disparity, because Presley and Davis were not similarly situated on remand. Because Presley’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we AFFIRM.
 
O'Bryan v. Holy See (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from W.D. KY)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0417p-06.pdf
-  Defendant Holy See appeals the district court’s denial, in part, of its motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Holy See contends that the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because the Holy See is immune from suit as a foreign state pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Plaintiffs James H. O’Bryan, Donald E. Poppe, and Michael J. Turner (“plaintiffs”) cross-appeal the district court’s partial grant of the Holy See’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs claim that the FSIA does not immunize the Holy See from suit on the grounds alleged in their complaint and thus the district court does in fact have subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The United States as intervenor and amicus supports the position of the Holy See with respect to the Holy See’s status as a foreign state and the constitutionality of the FSIA. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
 
USA v. Robinson (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0418p-06.pdf
-  Defendant-Appellant Chris Robinson appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Robinson argues that: (1) the district court erroneously instructed the jury to determine the quantity of cocaine “involved in the conspiracy” instead of the quantity individually attributable to him; (2) the district court failed to charge a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) as a lesser-included offense; (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove his participation in a conspiracy; and (4) there was a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, we AFFIRM.
 
Stuart Brinley v. LPP Mortgage, Ltd (Nov. 24, 2008)(Appeal from W.D. KY)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0420p-06.pdf
-  Debtors-Appellants Stuart C. Brinley (“Brinley”) and Fredrick L. Radcliffe, Jr.(“Radcliffe”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s opinion and order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order which allowed the Trustee, William W. Lawrence, to revoke his abandonment of Appellants’ real property. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s opinion and order.
 
Chamar Avery v. John Prelesnik (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from W.D. MI)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0422p-06.pdf
-  Petitioner Chamar Avery was convicted in Michigan state court of second degree murder. After exhausting his state appeals, Avery petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted his petition, holding that Avery was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to investigate and interview potential alibi witnesses and that the Michigan Court of Appeals’s conclusion to the contrary was objectively unreasonable. We agree and AFFIRM the district court’s well-reasoned judgment.
 
USA v. Stephens (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. MI)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0423p-06.pdf
-  Damon L. Stephens was convicted by a jury of two drug-related crimes committed two months apart. The district court sentenced Stephens as a career offender to 270 months of imprisonment. He now challenges both his convictions and his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM Stephens’s conviction, but VACATE his sentence and REMAND the case for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
 
Jordan v. Comm Social Security (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from W.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0425p-06.pdf
-  Dineen Jordan suffered an on-the-job back injury in 1991. She filed an application for Social Security disability benefits 12 years later, claiming that she could not work because she suffered from back pain and fibromyalgia as a result of the 1991 injury. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that her complaints of impairment were not credible. The ALJ specifically relied on the opinions of two physicians who stated that Jordan was exaggerating her symptoms, one of whom had watched surveillance videos showing that Jordan was functioning with no signs of debilitation. In addition, the ALJ concluded that, while Jordan could not perform the duties of her old job, there were a wide variety of light-duty jobs available to her. Jordan was thus found not to be disabled for Social Security purposes. Her request for review was subsequently denied by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration (SSA), which caused Jordan to file a civil action in the federal district court. The district court issued an order affirming the SSA’s decision, holding that the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence. Because we conclude that the ALJ lacked sufficient evidence to make a finding regarding Jordan’s future job prospects, we VACATE the judgment of the district court with instructions to REMAND the case to the SSA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 
Ronald Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Service (Nov. 25, 2008)(Appeal from E.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0426p-06.pdf
-  Defendant-Appellant Chattanooga City Wide Service Department (“CWS”) appeals the district court’s entry of judgment following a bench trial awarding Plaintiff-Appellee Ronald L. Madden (“Madden”) back pay, front pay, and compensatory damages on his claim that CWS terminated his employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 et seq. Madden, who is African-American, worked as a crew worker for CWS until he was fired following an incident on March 22, 2006, in which he set off firecrackers at a work site and was reported by his white supervisor to senior managers. White employees had set off firecrackers or similar devices in the presence of supervisors without facing discipline. On appeal, CWS argues that (1) the district court erred in finding that CWS intentionally discriminated against Madden, (2) the district court erred in failing to toll the award of back pay because Madden refused an offer of reinstatement, and (3) the district court erred by awarding excessive front pay. Because the district court did not clearly err in finding intentional discrimination and did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment for Madden.