Join!  |   Find Us  |   Contact Us  |   Search  |   Home
Services Online Catalog Research Tools CLE News About the Library
Search our online catalog for print and electronic legal resources.

Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 or 2006.

If you would like to receive a daily e-mail with same-day case updates, please join our Members-Only discussion list.  Not a member?  Join today!

Jan. 19, 2006

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Age-discrimination case
- Breach of trust
- Federal Arson statute
 

Ohio Supreme Court
 
No Opinions.
 
First District Court of Appeals
[Search Other Ohio Districts]
 
No Opinions.
 
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases
 
No Opinions.
 
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases
Browning v. Army  (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the E.D. Kentucky)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0023p-06.pdf
-  In this age-discrimination case, David Browning, a 48-year-old male, claims that the Army's use of a matrix of job-related criteria to determine which applicant was best qualified for an open position was a pretext designed to mask a discriminatory motive. Browning worked in the Ammunitions Operation Division (AOD) at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) in Richmond, Kentucky as a Material Handler and Forklift Operator/Supervisor. In 1996, the BGAD Civilian Personnel Office advertised that an Explosives and Handler Supervisor position was open in the AOD. Browning and five other individuals applied for this position. Smiley Courtney, the Chief of the AOD, prepared a matrix of job-related criteria to determine which applicant was best qualified. After reviewing the applications, Courtney ranked Browning third. Courtney subsequently awarded the position to Steven Rhodus, a 33-year-old First-Line Supervisor whom Courtney had ranked as the most-qualified applicant. Claiming that he was discriminated against because of his age, Browning filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March of 1996. The EEOC found that the Army had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Rhodus. Browning then filed suit in the district court, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to the Army on all claims. On appeal, Browning argues that the district court erred in holding that he had failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to whether the Army's reason for not promoting him was a pretext designed to hide unlawful discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
 
Evans v. Pearson Enter Inc (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the E.D. Michigan)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0024p-06.pdf
-  This diversity action concerns claims for breach of trust, shareholder oppression, and common-law fraud and misrepresentation as governed by Michigan law. It also presents an interesting federal question as to the breadth of the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Jane Evans has an interest in three trusts, whose primary assets are voting and nonvoting stock in Ervin Industries, a family-owned corporation. Evans' family members, who have interests in two of the three trusts, are the other beneficiaries of the voting-stock trust. In 2001, Evans sued her siblings, the trust company defendant Bank One, and defendant Ervin Industries in Michigan probate court. The essence of her claim was that Bank One's lending relationship with Ervin Industries caused Bank One to have a conflict of interest and abdicate its responsibilities as trustee in the course of three business transactions, occurring in 1993, 1996, and 1999. The probate court dismissed her suit, and the Michigan Court of Appeals recently affirmed. Before the probate court dismissed her suit, Evans brought similar claims in federal district court. She alleged tortious conduct in connection with the same three business transactions and sued Ervin Industries, Pearson Enterprises, Bank One Trust Company, Bank One N.A., her brother John Pearson, and Bank One trust officer James Meretta. The district court dismissed all of her claims in response to defendants' motions to dismiss. The district court held that the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction divested it of jurisdiction to entertain Evans' claim for breach of trust. The court dismissed all of Evans' other claims on grounds of collateral estoppel or inadequate pleading. The lower court also refused or declined to consider Evans' requests to amend her complaint. Evans appeals, challenging (1) the dismissal of her claims for breach of trust, shareholder oppression, and fraud; and (2) the denial of her request to amend her complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
 
Logan v. USA (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the W.D. Kentucky)
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0025p-06.pdf
-  Petitioner, sentenced under the federal arson statute provision for a higher maximum penalty "when death results," argues in this collateral attack upon his sentence that the jury, not the district judge, should have determined the fact that deaths resulted from the fire that he set. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), decided during the pendency of petitioner's direct appeal, held that a sentence under the federal carjacking statute provision for a higher maximum penalty "when death results" required a jury determination that death resulted from the carjacking. Because no basis has been articulated for distinguishing the effect of the two statutes, Jones requires that, in order for the court to impose a sentence under the federal arson statute provision for a higher maximum penalty "when death results," the fact of death must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We nonetheless affirm the denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because petitioner never raised the issue, either at trial or on direct review, despite the apparent opportunity to do so at both levels.
WebCite Citation
  OR
Keyword Search:

Daily Case Updates