|
|
Daily Case Update Archive
As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the
Ohio Supreme Court, the
Ohio State First District
Court of Appeals, and the United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. You can read
the latest summaries or archived summaries from
2005 or
2006.
If you would like to receive a daily e-mail with same-day case updates,
please join our Members-Only
discussion list. Not a member?
Join today!
Jan. 19, 2006
Ohio Supreme Court
| Ohio First District |
U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
TOPICS:
- Age-discrimination case
- Breach of trust
- Federal Arson statute
- Ohio Supreme Court
-
- No Opinions.
-
- First District Court of Appeals
- [Search Other Ohio Districts]
- No Opinions.
-
-
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ohio Cases
-
- No Opinions.
- U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases
-
Browning v. Army (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the E.D.
Kentucky)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0023p-06.pdf
- In this age-discrimination case, David Browning, a 48-year-old
male, claims that the Army's use of a matrix of job-related criteria to
determine which applicant was best qualified for an open position was a
pretext designed to mask a discriminatory motive. Browning worked in the
Ammunitions Operation Division (AOD) at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD)
in Richmond, Kentucky as a Material Handler and Forklift
Operator/Supervisor. In 1996, the BGAD Civilian Personnel Office
advertised that an Explosives and Handler Supervisor position was open
in the AOD. Browning and five other individuals applied for this
position. Smiley Courtney, the Chief of the AOD, prepared a matrix of
job-related criteria to determine which applicant was best qualified.
After reviewing the applications, Courtney ranked Browning third.
Courtney subsequently awarded the position to Steven Rhodus, a
33-year-old First-Line Supervisor whom Courtney had ranked as the
most-qualified applicant. Claiming that he was discriminated against
because of his age, Browning filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March of 1996. The EEOC found that the
Army had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Rhodus.
Browning then filed suit in the district court, alleging age
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to the Army on all
claims. On appeal, Browning argues that the district court erred in
holding that he had failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a
jury question as to whether the Army's reason for not promoting him was
a pretext designed to hide unlawful discrimination. For the reasons set
forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Evans v. Pearson Enter Inc (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the E.D.
Michigan)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0024p-06.pdf
- This diversity action concerns claims for breach of trust,
shareholder oppression, and common-law fraud and misrepresentation as
governed by Michigan law. It also presents an interesting federal
question as to the breadth of the "probate exception" to federal
jurisdiction. Plaintiff Jane Evans has an interest in three trusts,
whose primary assets are voting and nonvoting stock in Ervin Industries,
a family-owned corporation. Evans' family members, who have interests in
two of the three trusts, are the other beneficiaries of the voting-stock
trust. In 2001, Evans sued her siblings, the trust company defendant
Bank One, and defendant Ervin Industries in Michigan probate court. The
essence of her claim was that Bank One's lending relationship with Ervin
Industries caused Bank One to have a conflict of interest and abdicate
its responsibilities as trustee in the course of three business
transactions, occurring in 1993, 1996, and 1999. The probate court
dismissed her suit, and the Michigan Court of Appeals recently affirmed.
Before the probate court dismissed her suit, Evans brought similar
claims in federal district court. She alleged tortious conduct in
connection with the same three business transactions and sued Ervin
Industries, Pearson Enterprises, Bank One Trust Company, Bank One N.A.,
her brother John Pearson, and Bank One trust officer James Meretta. The
district court dismissed all of her claims in response to defendants'
motions to dismiss. The district court held that the "probate exception"
to federal jurisdiction divested it of jurisdiction to entertain Evans'
claim for breach of trust. The court dismissed all of Evans' other
claims on grounds of collateral estoppel or inadequate pleading. The
lower court also refused or declined to consider Evans' requests to
amend her complaint. Evans appeals, challenging (1) the dismissal of her
claims for breach of trust, shareholder oppression, and fraud; and (2)
the denial of her request to amend her complaint. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Logan v. USA (January 19, 2006) (Appeal from the W.D. Kentucky)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0025p-06.pdf
- Petitioner, sentenced under the federal arson statute provision
for a higher maximum penalty "when death results," argues in this
collateral attack upon his sentence that the jury, not the district
judge, should have determined the fact that deaths resulted from the
fire that he set. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), decided
during the pendency of petitioner's direct appeal, held that a sentence
under the federal carjacking statute provision for a higher maximum
penalty "when death results" required a jury determination that death
resulted from the carjacking. Because no basis has been articulated for
distinguishing the effect of the two statutes, Jones requires that, in
order for the court to impose a sentence under the federal arson statute
provision for a higher maximum penalty "when death results," the fact of
death must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We
nonetheless affirm the denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because
petitioner never raised the issue, either at trial or on direct review,
despite the apparent opportunity to do so at both levels.
|
Daily Case Updates
|