Daily Case Update Archive

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Feb. 27, 2006

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Sentencing Statutes
- Limited remand
- Fourth Amendment
- Fourteenth Amendment
- Sentencing Guidelines
- Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

State v. Foster (February 27, 2006) (2006-Ohio-856)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-ohio-856.pdf
-  The question presented in these four cases, consolidated sua sponte, is whether Ohio's felony sentencing structure violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the manner set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. Because we determine that portions of the applicable statutes are unconstitutional, we apply a severance remedy similar to that adopted in United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621. This opinion will (1) summarize the Sixth Amendment principles of Apprendi and Blakely, (2) present the history of the Foster, Quinones, Adams, and Horn appeals, (3) provide an overview of Ohio sentencing statutes, (4) measure the statutes against the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and (5) apply a remedy for the
constitutional violation.
 
State v. Mathis (February 27, 2006) (2006-Ohio-855)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-ohio-855.pdf
-  Criminal law * Sentencing * Felonies * Appellate review * R.C. 2953.08(G) * Appellate court may order limited remand for trial court to supplement record when findings required by R.C. 2929.13(D) or 2929.20(H) are missing from record. We accepted discretionary appeals and consolidated these two cases that questioned whether the court of appeals may order a limited remand for necessary statutory findings to be placed on the record or whether it must vacate the sentence and remand for a de novo sentencing hearing.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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No Opinion.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

USA v. Dillard  (February 27, 2006) (Appeal for N.D. Ohio)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0073p-06.pdf
-  Defendant-Appellant Irwin Dillard appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After Dillard was arrested by the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) in connection with a drug sale, officers drove to his duplex, obtained the consent of his girlfriend, Arion Holton, to search his apartment, and discovered crack cocaine. On appeal, Dillard contends that: (1) the district court erred when it failed to credit Holton's testimony that the officers used Dillard's key to enter the front door of the duplex, entered the apartment unannounced, and forced her to consent to the search; (2) the district court erred when it ruled that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the unlocked common hallway of the duplex; and (3) his case should be remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Judgment AFFIRMED.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Jones v. Reynolds (February 27, 2006) (Appeal from E.D. Michigan)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0070p-06.pdf
-  At 1:45 a.m. on October 8, 2001, Aaron Reynolds and Mustapha Atat began a drag race on a public street on the outskirts of Detroit. After roughly one-sixth of a mile, Reynolds lost control of his car and it veered into a crowd of spectators, striking Denise Jones and killing her. What separates this calamity from many others is that police officers from the City of Lincoln Park, a suburb of Detroit, arrived at the scene before the race and had an opportunity to prevent it from beginning. Not only did they fail to stop the race but, so far as this summary-judgment record shows, they also expressly allowed the participants to proceed with the race. For their part in this incident, the officers faced separate state-law criminal charges, a separate state-law civil lawsuit and eventually this § 1983 action, which claimed that the misconduct of the officers and the City of Lincoln Park violated Jones' substantive due process rights. When a claimant attempts to hold public officials responsible for private acts of violence under the Fourteenth Amendment, as this § 1983 action does, the depravity of the fact pattern often is enough to make "a devil[] sick of sin." Wilfred Owen, Dulce Et Decorum Est (1918). This case is no exception. And when a claimant argues that government officials failed to prevent private individuals from causing another injury, as this § 1983 action does, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and its progeny rarely permit the claim to go forward. This case is no exception. Because the officers did not have custody of Denise Jones at the time of the accident, because the officers' actions did not place Denise Jones in any more danger than she voluntarily undertook before they arrived and because the officers' participation in this tragedy did not specially place Denise Jones at any more risk than the 150*300 people attending the drag race, all relevant precedent requires us to uphold the judgment of the district court summarily rejecting this constitutional claim.
 
USA v. Galloway (February 27, 2006) (Appeal from W.D. Tennessee)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0071p-06.pdf
-  The United States appeals the district court's decision not to sentence Eriki Galloway as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
 
USA v. Wilson (February 27, 2006) (Appeal from E.D. Kentucky)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0072p-06.pdf
-  The government moves to dismiss defendant's appeal on the ground that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his guilty plea conviction and sentence. We hereby grant the motion and dismiss this appeal. In doing so, we hold that, although some of the terms of the plea agreement were explained to defendant by the United States Attorney, rather than the judge, there was no violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N). Alternatively, we hold that, even assuming a technical variation of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) occurred, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and therefore was harmless error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h).
 

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