Daily Case Update Archive

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April 18, 2006

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Constitutional rights - request legal counsel
- Truth in Lending Act
- Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
- Equal Access to Justice Act
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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No Opinions.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

Van Hook v. Anderson  (April 18, 2006) Appeal from S.D. Ohio
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0140p-06.pdf
-  This is a habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after petitioner, Robert Van Hook, was convicted by a three-judge panel of capital murder and aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand on the ground that Van Hook's constitutional rights were infringed when Cincinnati police started an interrogation anew with Van Hook after he had requested legal counsel in clear violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The police bungled an otherwise strong case. As a result of this violation, Van Hook's subsequent incriminating statements and confession should have been suppressed.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Barrett v. Bank One NA  (April 18, 2006) Appeal from E.D. Kentucky
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0137p-06.pdf
-  The Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.), "was enacted to promote the informed use of credit by consumers by requiring meaningful disclosure of credit terms," Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N. A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998). "[W]hen a loan made in a consumer credit transaction is secured by the borrower's principal dwelling," the Act permits the borrower to "rescind the loan agreement," Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411 (1998), up to three business days after the transaction, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). When the lender "fails to deliver certain forms or to disclose important terms accurately" to the borrower, the Act extends the borrower's right to rescind the transaction to three years. Beach, 523 U.S. at 411. And when the Act permits borrowers to rescind "the transaction," 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), it permits them not only to remove the security interest on their home but also to recover certain fees incurred in the transaction, id. § 1635(b). Seeking to benefit from declining interest rates, William and Sandra Barrett refinanced a mortgage on their home several times in 2000 and 2001. In May 2000 and again in January 2001, the Barretts borrowed money from Bank One, securing the loan in each instance with a security interest in their home. In May 2001, they refinanced their obligations with Bank One with a loan from another lender, prompting Bank One to release its security interest in the Barretts' home. Roughly two years later, the Barretts complained that Bank One had violated the Act's disclosure requirements in lending them money in May 2000 and January 2001 and sought to rescind both transactions. Bank One refused, claiming that both loans had been refinanced and that both security interests had been removed, leaving nothing for the bank to rescind. The district court agreed with the bank. We reverse because nothing in the legislation or its implementing regulations says that the act of refinancing extinguishes a borrower's unexpired right to rescind a loan transaction and because the right to rescind a transaction under the Act not only gives consumers the right to release the security interest in their home but also gives them the right to recover certain fees incurred in the transaction.
 
Fulcher v. Motley (April 18, 2006) Appeal from W.D. Kentucky
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0138p-06.pdf
-  Elem Ray Fulcher, currently serving a life sentence for murder, burglary, and robbery, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The evidence against Fulcher included statements from a police station interview with his then girlfriend, Patricia Sue Ash, taped soon after the crime. The couple later married; Ash invoked marital privilege under Kentucky law and was thus unavailable for cross-examination at Fulcher's trial. Fulcher contends that the admission of Ash's statements violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, according to both the clearly established law at the time and the later case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which he argues should apply retroactively. We find that the admission of Ash's statements did violate Fulcher's clearly established rights and that the error was not harmless. We thus REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for entry of the writ.
 
Marshall v. Comm Social Security (April 18, 2006) Appeal from E.D. Kentucky
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0139p-06.pdf
-  Marshall appeals an order of the district court denying his motion for attorney's fees brought pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Marshall argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that he was not the "prevailing party" for EAJA purposes. We agree and accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
 

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