Daily Case Update Archive

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May 5, 2006

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Homicide - Instructions - Evidence
- Miranda - Drugs
- Sex Offenses
- Procedure - Civil Rules
- Civil Miscellaneous - Procedure - Rules
- Patent-infringement claim
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinion.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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State v. Levett (May 5, 2006) (2006-ohio-2222)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2006/2006-ohio-2222.pdf
-  In a murder trial where the defendant claimed self-defense, the
trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that it could
consider a permissive presumption concerning the defendant's purpose,
and there was no error in how the court instructed the jury on the
defendant's duty to retreat or in its determination that the defendant
was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter when
his own testimony was that he had acted out of fear, not anger. The
defendant's conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence, when his claim of self-defense was not supported by the
evidence; the defendant did not have a right to defend himself with
lethal force peremptorily. While testimony by the defendant concerning
the victim's reputation for violence and specific instances of violent
conduct by the victim would have been admissible to show the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, there was no
proffer of the defendant's testimony and no indication whether the
victim's alleged arrest had anything to do with guns or violence. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted two
photographs taken of the victim after he had been shot:  the photographs
were not so gruesome as to produce an inflammatory reaction by the jury
against the defendant, and they were properly introduced in connection
with the coroner's testimony to help to explain and clarify the
testimony.  Judgment AFFIRMED.

State v. McKenzie (May 5, 2006) (2006-ohio-2223)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2006/2006-ohio-2223.pdf
-  The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress
when there was competent, credible evidence that the defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights, waived his rights, and voluntarily made a
statement to the police. The defendant's conviction for possession of
cocaine was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, when a
police officer testified that the defendant threw a baggie of cocaine on
the ground, and when another officer testified that the defendant
admitted that he had facilitated a drug deal.  Judgment AFFIRMED.

State v. Collins (May 5, 2006) (2006-ohio-2224)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2006/2006-ohio-2224.pdf
-  Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's adjudication of
the defendant as a sexual predator, when the defendant brutally attacked
and raped a woman, had a lengthy criminal record, failed to complete
sex-offender treatment, demonstrated no remorse for his offenses and no
inclination to change his behaviors, and scored high on a test that
measured his risk of re-offending. Judgment AFFIRMED.

Cincinnati Bell Directory, Inc. v. Midwest Distributors, Inc.(May 5, 2006) (2006-ohio-2225)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2006/2006-ohio-2225.pdf
-  A party seeking relief from a default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)
must show (1) the existence of a meritorious defense, (2) entitlement to
relief under one of the grounds set forth in the rule, and (3) that the
motion is made within a reasonable time.   The trial court properly
refused to set aside a default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B):  (1) the
defendant lacked a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's contract
claim, when one of its corporate officers had signed the contracts that
had been breached; and (2) the motion to set aside the judgment was not
filed within a reasonable time, when over a year and eight months had
passed since the same corporate officer had signed the certified mail
receipt upon service of the complaint. Judgment AFFIRMED.

Jane Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati (May 5, 2006) (2006-ohio-2222)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2006/2006-ohio-2222.pdf
-  For purposes of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, all the plaintiff's
allegations must be considered true, and when a plaintiff has alleged
the necessary elements of equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations
can not, as a matter of law, justify the dismissal of the complaint.
Although a court should refrain from assessing the validity of a
religious institution's beliefs, it is fully entitled to determine
whether the institution is actually motivated by a secular purpose and
is solely relying on its religious beliefs as a pretext. Because the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state claims upon which relief could
be granted for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of
filial consortium, and negligent supervision and retention, those claims
were properly dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Judgment AFFIRMED in
part, REVERSED inpart, and cause REMANDED.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

Caradon Doors v. Eagle-Picher (May 5, 2006) Appeal from S.D. Ohio
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0152p-06.pdf
-  Eagle-Picher Industries emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
November 1996, and in this case seeks to stay a $20 million
patent-infringement action filed by Caradon Doors and Windows against it
in May 1997. After considerable collateral skirmishing, the merits of
the stay motion focused on the following disagreement. Eagle-Picher
contends that the patent-infringement claim cannot proceed because the
confirmation of the 1996 reorganization plan discharged Caradon's
claim. Caradon responds that the patent-infringement claim arose in the
ordinary course of doing business with the debtor and that the plan by
its terms excepted this kind of claim from discharge. The bankruptcy
court agreed with Eagle-Picher while the district court agreed with
Caradon. We agree with the district court and affirm.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

No Opinion.
 

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