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January 26th, 2007

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Procedure - Rules - Appellate Review - civil
- Homicide - Miranda - New Trial
- Real Property - Constitutional Law/Civil
- Prosecutor - Evidence - Constitutional law - Criminal
- Sentencing
- Habeas corpus
- Qualified immunity
- Arbitration award - employment cost-of-living
- Copyright and trademark infringement
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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Lambda Research Inc., et al. vs. Jacobs, et al. (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-309)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-309.pdf
-  In a case involving alleged breaches of confidentiality and disclosures of trade secrets, the trial court abused its discretion in denying a nonparty's motion to quash subpoenas and for a protective order on the basis of an exceptionally broad view of discovery that not only conflicted with the protections afforded to nonparties and trade secrets under Civ.R. 45(C) and Civ.R. 26(C), but was also devoid of any sound reasoning process. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a party's motion to compel discovery from a nonparty of materials that included trade secrets, when its ruling on the motion was inconsistent with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over discovery issues that had already been raised on appeal. Judgment REVERSED and Cause REMANDED.

State v. Bell (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-310)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-310.pdf
-  The defendant's conviction for aggravated murder was supported by sufficient evidence: The jury could have easily inferred that the defendant had purposely killed the victim, where the defendant possessed the victim's semiautomatic .380 pistol just prior to the shooting, the defendant was seen standing a few feet behind the victim immediately after the shooting, and the forensic evidence demonstrated that the shooter had stood a few feet behind the victim when he fired the murder weapon, a .380 semiautomatic pistol. The evidence supported a finding that the defendant committed the murder with prior calculation and design, where the defendant had told a friend that he was going "to catch a body," and where he thereafter persuaded the victim to accompany him outside and then asked the victim for his gun before shooting him. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress post-arrest statements, where the defendant had waived his Miranda rights, and where he had not clearly and unambiguous invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel by requesting to call an individual whom he failed to identify as an attorney. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial: The newly discovered evidence presented in the affidavit of an alleged eyewitness was not sufficiently reliable, due to inconsistencies with prior statements, to have the strong probability of changing the result if a new trial was granted. Judgment AFFIRMED.

City of Cincinnati vs. Bucher, et al.  (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-311)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-311.pdf
-  The trial court erred in permitting a city to appropriate parcels of real property when the ordinance upon which the order of appropriation was based is unconstitutionally vague: In defining a "blighted area" subject to the city's power of eminent domain, Cincinnati Municipal Code 725-1-B lists factors such as deterioration, faulty lot layout, and diversity of ownership that are likely be present in and characterize any urban area, and the ordinance therefore does not give property owners adequate notice of what constitutes blight. See Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115. Judgment REVERSED and Final Judgment entered.

State v. Minor (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-312)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-312.pdf
-  The prosecutor's introduction of evidence of threats against its witnesses did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct: The evidence was proper to address why the witnesses had not come forward immediately after the offense, and the prosecutor did not use argument about the threats to improperly appeal to the jury's sympathy. The evidence of the threats against prosecution witnesses was not inadmissible other-acts evidence and did not result in a constitutional violation: There was no testimony that the defendant was responsible for the threats, and because the threats were not testimonial, their admission into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington {2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State v. Canady  (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-313)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-313.pdf
-  When agreed sentences are within the statutory range of allowable sentences, R.C. 2958.08(D) puts the sentences beyond appellate review, even if they implicate the sentencing statutes the Ohio Supreme Court has found unconstitutional in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. The changes in the sentencing laws resulting from State v. Foster did not render the defendant's plea unknowing or involuntary: the trial court complied with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C); the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the penalties involved, the effect of his guilty plea, and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty; and he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State v. Lochett  (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-308)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-308.pdf
-  Resentencing the defendant under State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, was not unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause: that clause is a limitation on legislative powers, and it does not apply to the judicial branch of government, courts, or judicial decision-making. Retroactive judicial decision-making is limited by the due process concept of fair warning: The defendant had fair warning of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Foster because his offense was committed after the United States Supreme Court's decisions declaring judicial fact-finding in the sentencing context unconstitutional. Due process also was not violated because Foster did not change the elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted or the potential punishment. Retroactive application of Foster does not violate the prohibition against retroactive laws in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The defendant's guilty plea was not rendered unknowing or involuntary by the changes in the sentencing laws resulting from Foster: A voluntary guilty plea made in light of the then applicable law does not become involuntary because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise. Moreover, the defendant did not show he suffered any prejudice as the result of his resentencing under Foster. Judgment AFFIRMED.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

USA v. Smith (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the S.D. Ohio)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0042p-06.pdf
-  Defendant Conrad Vernon Smith appeals his 57-month sentence, asserting that the sentence is unreasonable because the district judge, in calculating the sentence, (1) engaged in impermissible fact-finding and (2) failed to follow the methodology set forth in U.S.S.G § 4A1.3, which resulted in a sentence that was greater than was necessary to comply with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For the reasons set forth below we AFFIRM the sentence of the district court.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Simmons v. Kapture (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0038p-06.pdf
-  Petitioner Patrick Simmons appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge his guilty plea entered in Michigan state court. Simmons claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the plea stage, and that the state should have provided him appointed counsel to represent him in the appellate process under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005). Simmons filed the present petition before the decision issued in Halbert. After the district court denied him relief, and this Court denied him a certificate of appealability, he filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ, remanding the case to this Court for further consideration in light of Halbert.

Hudson v. Hudson  (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Tenn.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0039p-06.pdf
-  Defendants, two Memphis police officers, appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity from the claims against them by Plaintiffs Justin Hudson and Pamela Davis for violating Jennifer Braddock's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. We reverse and hold that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

MI Family Resources v. Local 517M SEIU (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0040p-06.pdf
-  Local 517M of the Service Employees International Union challenges the decision of the district court vacating an arbitration award in its favor. Because the arbitrator was "acting within the scope of his authority" in resolving this dispute, because the company has not charged the arbitrator with fraud or dishonesty in making the award, because the arbitrator was "arguably construing . . . the contract" when he awarded union employees a 4% costof- living increase for 2003 and because the company has shown no more than that the arbitrator made an error, perhaps even a "serious error," in interpreting the contract, we reverse and direct the district court to enter an order enforcing the award. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38-39 (1987).

Brilliance Audio v. Haights Cross, et al (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0041p-06.pdf
-  Plaintiff-appellant Brilliance Audio ("Brilliance") appeals from the district court's dismissal of its claims for copyright and trademark infringement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This case presents a question that has not been considered by this or any other court - whether the record rental exception to copyright's first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A), applies to all sound recordings, or only sound recordings of musical works. Specifically, this case asks whether the exception applies to sound recordings of literary works (known as "audiobooks" or "books on tape"). We find that it does not, and thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Brilliance's claims for copyright infringement. We disagree, however, with the district court's dismissal of Brilliance's claims for trademark infringement. Following the law of our sister circuits, we conclude that two exceptions exist to the first sale doctrine under trademark law and that Brilliance's complaint, construed broadly, has alleged that these exceptions apply in the present case. Thus, we affirm the decision of the district court in respect to the copyright claims but reverse in respect to the trademark claims.
 

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