|
|
Daily Case Update Archive
As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the
Ohio Supreme Court, the
Ohio State First District
Court of Appeals, and the United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. You can read
the latest summaries or archived summaries from
2005 ,
2006 ,
2007 ,
2008 ,
2009 ,
2010.
If you would like to receive a daily e-mail with same-day case updates,
please join our Subscribers-Only
discussion list. Not a subscriber?
Join today!
January 26th, 2007
Ohio Supreme Court
| Ohio First District |
U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
TOPICS:
- Procedure - Rules - Appellate Review - civil
- Homicide - Miranda - New Trial
- Real Property - Constitutional Law/Civil
- Prosecutor - Evidence - Constitutional law - Criminal
- Sentencing
- Habeas corpus
- Qualified immunity
- Arbitration award - employment cost-of-living
- Copyright and trademark infringement
- Ohio Supreme Court
-
- No Opinions.
- First District Court of Appeals
- [Search Other Ohio Districts]
-
Lambda Research Inc., et al. vs. Jacobs, et al. (Jan. 26, 2007)
(2007-Ohio-309)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-309.pdf
- In a case involving alleged breaches of confidentiality and
disclosures of trade secrets, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a nonparty's motion to quash subpoenas and for a protective order on
the basis of an exceptionally broad view of discovery that not only
conflicted with the protections afforded to nonparties and trade secrets
under Civ.R. 45(C) and Civ.R. 26(C), but was also devoid of any sound
reasoning process. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a party's
motion to compel discovery from a nonparty of materials that included trade
secrets, when its ruling on the motion was inconsistent with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over discovery issues that had already been raised on
appeal. Judgment REVERSED and Cause REMANDED.
State v. Bell (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-310)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-310.pdf
- The defendant's conviction for aggravated murder was supported by
sufficient evidence: The jury could have easily inferred that the defendant
had purposely killed the victim, where the defendant possessed the victim's
semiautomatic .380 pistol just prior to the shooting, the defendant was seen
standing a few feet behind the victim immediately after the shooting, and
the forensic evidence demonstrated that the shooter had stood a few feet
behind the victim when he fired the murder weapon, a .380 semiautomatic
pistol. The evidence supported a finding that the defendant committed the
murder with prior calculation and design, where the defendant had told a
friend that he was going "to catch a body," and where he thereafter
persuaded the victim to accompany him outside and then asked the victim for
his gun before shooting him. The trial court did not err in denying the
defendant's motion to suppress post-arrest statements, where the defendant
had waived his Miranda rights, and where he had not clearly and unambiguous
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel by requesting to call an
individual whom he failed to identify as an attorney. The trial court did
not err in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial: The newly
discovered evidence presented in the affidavit of an alleged eyewitness was
not sufficiently reliable, due to inconsistencies with prior statements, to
have the strong probability of changing the result if a new trial was
granted. Judgment AFFIRMED.
City of Cincinnati vs. Bucher, et al. (Jan. 26, 2007)
(2007-Ohio-311)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-311.pdf
- The trial court erred in permitting a city to appropriate parcels of
real property when the ordinance upon which the order of appropriation was
based is unconstitutionally vague: In defining a "blighted area" subject to
the city's power of eminent domain, Cincinnati Municipal Code 725-1-B lists
factors such as deterioration, faulty lot layout, and diversity of ownership
that are likely be present in and characterize any urban area, and the
ordinance therefore does not give property owners adequate notice of what
constitutes blight. See Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353,
2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115. Judgment REVERSED and Final Judgment
entered.
State v. Minor (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-312)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-312.pdf
- The prosecutor's introduction of evidence of threats against its
witnesses did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct: The evidence was
proper to address why the witnesses had not come forward immediately after
the offense, and the prosecutor did not use argument about the threats to
improperly appeal to the jury's sympathy. The evidence of the threats
against prosecution witnesses was not inadmissible other-acts evidence and
did not result in a constitutional violation: There was no testimony that
the defendant was responsible for the threats, and because the threats were
not testimonial, their admission into evidence did not violate the
Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington {2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124
S.Ct. 1354. Judgment AFFIRMED.
State v. Canady (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-313)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-313.pdf
- When agreed sentences are within the statutory range of allowable
sentences, R.C. 2958.08(D) puts the sentences beyond appellate review, even
if they implicate the sentencing statutes the Ohio Supreme Court has found
unconstitutional in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845
N.E.2d 470. The changes in the sentencing laws resulting from State v.
Foster did not render the defendant's plea unknowing or involuntary: the
trial court complied with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C); the defendant
understood the nature of the charges against him, the penalties involved,
the effect of his guilty plea, and the rights he was waiving by pleading
guilty; and he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. Judgment
AFFIRMED.
State v. Lochett (Jan. 26, 2007) (2007-Ohio-308)
-
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/1/2007/2007-ohio-308.pdf
- Resentencing the defendant under State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, was not unconstitutional under the Ex Post
Facto Clause: that clause is a limitation on legislative powers, and it does
not apply to the judicial branch of government, courts, or judicial
decision-making. Retroactive judicial decision-making is limited by the due
process concept of fair warning: The defendant had fair warning of the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Foster because his offense was committed after
the United States Supreme Court's decisions declaring judicial fact-finding
in the sentencing context unconstitutional. Due process also was not
violated because Foster did not change the elements of the offense for which
the defendant was convicted or the potential punishment. Retroactive
application of Foster does not violate the prohibition against retroactive
laws in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The defendant's
guilty plea was not rendered unknowing or involuntary by the changes in the
sentencing laws resulting from Foster: A voluntary guilty plea made in light
of the then applicable law does not become involuntary because later
judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.
Moreover, the defendant did not show he suffered any prejudice as the result
of his resentencing under Foster. Judgment AFFIRMED.
- U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ohio Cases
-
- USA v. Smith (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the S.D. Ohio)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0042p-06.pdf
- Defendant Conrad Vernon Smith appeals his 57-month sentence,
asserting that the sentence is unreasonable because the district judge, in
calculating the sentence, (1) engaged in impermissible fact-finding and (2)
failed to follow the methodology set forth in U.S.S.G § 4A1.3, which
resulted in a sentence that was greater than was necessary to comply with
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For the reasons set forth
below we AFFIRM the sentence of the district court.
- U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases
-
-
Simmons v. Kapture (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0038p-06.pdf
- Petitioner Patrick Simmons appeals the district court's denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge his
guilty plea entered in Michigan state court. Simmons claims that his plea
was not knowing and voluntary, that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel in the plea stage, and that the state should have provided him
appointed counsel to represent him in the appellate process under the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.
Ct. 2582 (2005). Simmons filed the present petition before the decision
issued in Halbert. After the district court denied him relief, and this
Court denied him a certificate of appealability, he filed a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ,
remanding the case to this Court for further consideration in light of
Halbert.
Hudson v. Hudson (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Tenn.)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0039p-06.pdf
- Defendants, two Memphis police officers, appeal the district court's
denial of qualified immunity from the claims against them by Plaintiffs
Justin Hudson and Pamela Davis for violating Jennifer Braddock's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law. We reverse and hold that these
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
MI Family Resources v. Local 517M SEIU (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the
W.D. Mich.)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0040p-06.pdf
- Local 517M of the Service Employees International Union challenges
the decision of the district court vacating an arbitration award in its
favor. Because the arbitrator was "acting within the scope of his authority"
in resolving this dispute, because the company has not charged the
arbitrator with fraud or dishonesty in making the award, because the
arbitrator was "arguably construing . . . the contract" when he awarded
union employees a 4% costof- living increase for 2003 and because the
company has shown no more than that the arbitrator made an error, perhaps
even a "serious error," in interpreting the contract, we reverse and direct
the district court to enter an order enforcing the award. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38-39 (1987).
Brilliance Audio v. Haights Cross, et al (Jan. 26, 2007) (Appeal from the
W.D. Mich.)
-
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0041p-06.pdf
- Plaintiff-appellant Brilliance Audio ("Brilliance") appeals from the
district court's dismissal of its claims for copyright and trademark
infringement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This case presents a question
that has not been considered by this or any other court - whether the record
rental exception to copyright's first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. §
109(b)(1)(A), applies to all sound recordings, or only sound recordings of
musical works. Specifically, this case asks whether the exception applies to
sound recordings of literary works (known as "audiobooks" or "books on
tape"). We find that it does not, and thus, the district court did not err
in dismissing Brilliance's claims for copyright infringement. We disagree,
however, with the district court's dismissal of Brilliance's claims for
trademark infringement. Following the law of our sister circuits, we
conclude that two exceptions exist to the first sale doctrine under
trademark law and that Brilliance's complaint, construed broadly, has
alleged that these exceptions apply in the present case. Thus, we affirm the
decision of the district court in respect to the copyright claims but
reverse in respect to the trademark claims.
|
Daily Case Updates
|