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January 30th, 2007

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Motion to reconsider petition - denied due to missed deadline
- Waiver of the right to testify - Motion to suppress - Confrontation Clause
- Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
- Breach of contract - Piercing the Corporate Veil - Tortious Interference with Contract
- Essential Insurance Act
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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No Opinions.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

USA v. Stover and USA v. Hinton (Jan. 30, 2007) (Appeal from the N.D. Ohio)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0046p-06.pdf
-  Defendants Bart Stover and Timothy Hinton appeal their criminal convictions. Defendant Stover was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), and one count of using a communication facility to facilitate the commission of a drug trafficking offense under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Defendant Hinton was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B); two counts of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D); and four counts of using a communication facility to facilitate the commission of a drug trafficking offense under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Randhawa v. Gonzales (Jan. 30, 2007) (Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0045p-06.pdf
-  Petitioner Munroop Randhawa ("Petitioner") argues on appeal that the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") improperly denied her motion to reconsider a previous BIA decision denying Petitioner's motion to reopen her removal proceedings as untimely pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner argues that a previously filed appeal to this Court tolled the time limit for filing her motion to reconsider with the BIA. For the reasons that follow, we DENY the petition for review. On October 31, 2002, the BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge, who concluded that Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) & (G)(i). Petitioner filed an untimely motion to reopen the BIA's decision on June 23, 2004, which the BIA denied for that reason on July 28, 2004. Petitioner then filed a timely petition for review of the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen; she also filed an untimely motion to reconsider the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen on March 2, 2005. On May 10, 2005, the BIA denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider because it was not timely filed. Petitioner then brought the instant petition for review, challenging the BIA's denial of her motion to reconsider. Petitioner argues that her previously filed petition for review tolls the 30-day deadline for filing a motion to reconsider.

Sault Ste Marie v. Granholm (Jan. 30, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0047p-06.pdf
-  Plaintiff Hannahville Indian Community ("Plaintiff Hannahville") appeals the district court's grant of a Motion to Enforce Stipulation and Consent Judgment in favor of the Governor of the State of Michigan ("Defendant") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 and 54. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's decision and REMAND to the district court to resolve ambiguous terms in the Stipulation and Consent Judgment with the aid of extrinsic evidence.

Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision (Jan. 30, 2007) (Appeal from the E.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0048p-06.pdf
-  Plaintiff Servo Kinetics, Inc. ("SKI") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Tokyo Precision Instruments Co. Ltd., ("TSS") and its parent, Moog, Inc. ("Moog").1 On appeal, SKI argues that (1) TSS breached its contract with SKI; (2) Moog is liable for TSS's breach of contract under a veil-piercing theory; and (3) Moog is liable for tortious interference with the contract between TSS and SKI. SKI also argues that the district court improperly denied partial summary judgment in its favor on the liability issue of the same claims. The contract at issue established an exclusive distribution agreement between TSS and SKI for a period of five years, whereby SKI would distribute servo valves manufactured by TSS. This is an action in diversity. The breach of contract claim is governed by Japanese law; the other claims are governed by Michigan law. Applying such law, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TSS on the issue of breach of contract and REVERSE summary judgment in favor of Moog on the issue of veil-piercing liability. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Moog on the tortious inference with contract claim, and AFFIRM the district court's denial of summary judgment in favor of SKI on all its claims.

McLiechey v. Bristol W Ins Co (Jan. 30, 2007) (Appeal from the W.D. Mich.)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0049p-06.pdf
-  Bristol West Insurance Company changed Burl and Cathy McLiechey's insurance policy after the McLiecheys moved into a higher risk area, received a worse credit rating, and had a two week lapse in insurance coverage due to a temporary inability to pay premiums. The McLiecheys allege, on behalf of similarly situated class members, that Bristol West's three justifications for changing their insurance policy violated Chapter 21 of the Michigan Insurance Code, a statute that regulates the setting of insurance rates. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.2101 et seq. The district court dismissed the McLiecheys' complaint because the statutes upon which the McLiecheys relied do not create a private cause of action. We affirm because the two Michigan statutes upon which the McLiecheys rely do not establish a cause of action.
 

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