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April 3, 2007

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States

TOPICS:
- Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
- Unfair labor practice
- Writ of Habeas Corpus - Strickland test
- ERISA - disability benefits

Ohio Supreme Court: No Opinions.
First District Court of Appeals: [Search Other Ohio Districts]; No Opinions.
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ohio Cases: No Opinions.
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases: Okoro v. Hemingway (April 3, 2007) ( Appeal from E.D. Mich.)
- http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0120p-06.pdf
- In its order dismissing Okoro's complaint, the district court relied
upon the then-governing law of this Circuit, which interpreted the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act to require prisoner-litigants to plead
that they had exhausted their available administrative remedies with
respect to all of their claims and all named defendants before filing
suit. This precedent has since been reversed by the Supreme Court. Jones
v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921, 923-25 (2007) (holding that (1) "failure
to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates
are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints"; (2) "exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an
individual later sued was not named in the grievances"; and (3) where a
complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the district
court should proceed with the exhausted claims while dismissing the
unexhausted claims, rather than dismissing the complaint in its
entirety). Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from judgment in instances
of "mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect," and governs
instances where the mistake was based upon legal error. Hopper v. Euclid
Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989). As Jones
makes clear, the precedent of our Court, upon which the district court
relied in dismissing Okoro's complaint, was a mistaken interpretation of
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. Thus, in light of Jones, Okoro is
entitled to relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). We reverse the
district court's dismissal of Okoro's complaint, and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with Jones.

Center Const. Co. v. NLRB (April 3, 2007) ( Appeal from National Labor
Relations Board Agency)
- http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0121p-06.pdf
- Center Construction Co. petitions for review of the National Labor
Relations Board's order finding Center committed numerous unfair labor
practices to combat the organization of Center's two-man plumbing staff
by Local 370 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
AFL-CIO. Local 370 intervened to oppose Center's petition and also
petitions for review of the one claim on which the Board reversed the
ALJ, finding Center had not committed an unfair labor practice. The
Board cross-petitions for enforcement. We deny Center's petition for
review, grant Local 370's petition, and grant the Board's petition for
enforcement except insofar as the Board held that Center had not
committed an unfair labor practice in threatening the sheet metal
workers with loss of jobs.

Riley v. Berghuis (April 3, 2007) ( Appeal from E.D. Mich.)
- http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0122p-06.pdf
- In 1998, Petitioner-Appellee Robert Riley was convicted in Michigan
state court of aiding and abetting the felony murder of Mark Seaton, and
sentenced to life in prison without parole. On direct appeal, Riley
argued that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney failed to move for a directed verdict of
acquittal at the close of the State's case-in-chief. The Michigan
Supreme Court rejected Riley's claim, holding that Riley's counsel was
not deficient within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), for failing to move for a directed verdict, because the
evidence adduced by the State was sufficient to support Riley's
conviction. Thereafter, Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the district court. The district court granted the petition,
concluding that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied the
Strickland test to the facts of Riley's case. For the reasons set forth
below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.

Rochow v. Life Ins Co (April 3, 2007) ( Appeal from E.D. Mich.)
- http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0123p-06.pdf
- Daniel Rochow, the former President of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.
("Gallagher"), currently suffers from HSV-Encephalitis, a rare and
severely debilitating disease. The question in this case is whether or
not the insurer, Life Insurance Company of North America ("LINA") acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded that Rochow was not
disabled on the date that he left his job, therefore denying his claim
for disability benefits. The district court held that LINA's
determination was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the
administrative record. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we AFFIRM
that decision.

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