Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 , 2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , 2010 , 2011.

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Nov. 26th, 2008

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Sentencing / Post-release control
- Concealed handgun license / Evidence / Insufficient / Manifest weight
- Postconviction relief
- Employment / Drug Test / Temperature measurement
- Motion to Suppress / Due Process / Ineffective Counsel / Sentencing
- Sentencing / Statutory range
- Search & Seizure / Sentencing
- Evidence / Weight / Insufficient / Motion for an acquittal
- DUI / Plea agreement / Sentencing / Similar crimes
- Search & Seizure
- Habeas petition / Postconviction / Certificate of appealability
- Help America Vote Act / Constitutional Law
- Community corrections sentences
- IRS / Res Judicata / Time-barred / Innocent-spouse relief
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
  

First District Court of Appeals

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*** Judgment Entries ***

State of Ohio vs. Sarah Schmidt (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080354_11262008.pdf
-  Schmidt entered guilty pleas to three counts of kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery, with gun specifications. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court incorrectly informed Schmidt that she could be subject to three years’ post-release control instead of the statutorily mandated five-year term. Schmidt now argues that the omission of mens rea allegations in the indictment mandated the reversal of her convictions. She also, argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to withdraw her guilty pleas in light of the court’s misstatements concerning post-release control during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy and that the trial court erred in failing to resentence her. Judgment AFFIRMED in Part, Sentence VACATED, and Cause REMANDED.

State of Ohio vs. Rodney Dorsey (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080349_11262008.pdf
-  Dorsey appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court convicting him of failing to promptly inform a police officer that he was carrying a firearm under a license to possess a concealed weapon. Dorsey now argues that the conviction was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Immanuel Dubose (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080309_11262008.pdf
-  Dubose appeals the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his R.C. 2953.21 petition for postconviction relief. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Virgil Tribble (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080262_11262008.pdf
-  Tribble challenges the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief. Judgment AFFIRMED.

John Lawson vs. Doran M. Christensen (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080240_11262008.pdf
-  Lawson appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees, Doran Christensen, M.D., Fluor Fernald, Inc. (“FFI”), and The Consortium for Environmental and Occupational Safety and Health, Inc., on his claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and tortious interference with business relationships. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Michael P. Carroll (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080204_11262008.pdf
-  Carroll shot and killed Casey Strotman. He was charged with reckless homicide with a gun specification and tampering with evidence. Carroll moved to suppress evidence—the trial court overruled his motion. Carroll then pleaded guilty to reckless homicide with a gun specification. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison for the reckless homicide and three years in pral of eight years. Carroll now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by (1) not granting his motion to suppress; (2) denying Carroll due process due to ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) imposing a sentence contrary to law. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Shakema Drummer (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080203_11262008.pdf
-  Drummer pleaded guilty to one count of tampering with records, a third-degree felony. The trial court sentenced Drummer to four years on the tampering charge, to one year on each theft charge, and to one and a half years on the forgery charge. She argues that her sentence was contrary to law. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Jamal Hampton (Nov. 26, 2008)(2008-ohio-6088)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6088.pdf
-  Competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that a police officer had not made a false statement intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth in an affidavit for a search warrant: the relevant facts were that the defendant had purchased what police believed to be a large amount of inositol, which, in their experience, was frequently used to cut cocaine, and the police did not have to have expert medical knowledge or use exact math as to the dosages. An affidavit stating (1) that the defendant had purchased one bottle of inositol, a legal product, (2) that police considered it to be a large amount of inositol, and (3) that inositol was often used to cut cocaine was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search the defendant’s residence. Even though the affidavit supporting a search warrant did not establish probable cause to search the defendant’s residence, the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively unreasonable; therefore, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Even though the trial court advised the defendant about post-release control at the plea hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the court must inform the defendant about post-release control at the sentencing hearing; and because the trial court did not do so, the sentence was void. Judgment AFFIRMED in Part, Sentence VACATED, and Cause REMANDED.

State of Ohio vs. Gamal A. Smith (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080183_11262008.pdf
-  The trial court convicted defendant-appellant Gamal Smith of two counts of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Gamal argues (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, (2) the weight of the evidence, and (3) that the trial court should have granted his Crim.R. 29 motion for an acquittal. Judgment AFFIRMED.

State of Ohio vs. Sarah Welsh (Nov. 26, 2008)
-  http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080170_11262008.pdf
-  Welsh killed Jean Marie Smith and seriously injured Gary Henderson when she drove her car while drunk. The trial court sentenced Welsh to a total of six years in prison, along with a lifetime driving suspension. Welsh argues that the trial court erred by failing to honor the potential sentencing agreement and by imposing a sentence that was inconsistent with sentences imposed on other defendants for similar crimes. Judgment AFFIRMED.

*** Opinion ***

State v. Caulton (Nov. 26, 2008)(2008-ohio-6090)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6090.pdf
-  The trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to suppress a scale seized from the center console of his car: the police officer’s prior contact with the defendant, as well as the defendant’s furtive movements during the stop, gave the officer the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited search of the car for her own safety, and this remained so even after the defendant had been removed from the car and placed in a police cruiser. Judgment REVERSED, and REMANDED.
e State’s burden of proof, and that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting inadmissible hearsay testimony. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
        

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

Doan v. Carter (Nov. 26th, 2008) (Appeal from S.D. Ohio)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0428p-06.pdf
-  A state-court jury convicted Vincent Doan of aggravated murder, with one death-penalty specification, and three counts of kidnapping. The court followed the recommendation of the jury and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the aggravated murder conviction and also imposed a nine-year prison term for the kidnapping convictions. In affirming his conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Doan’s claims that the trial court violated his due process rights by utilizing a jury instruction that allegedly reduced the State’s burden of proof, and that the trial court violated Doan’s Confrontation Clause rights by admitting hearsay statements indicating that Doan had physically abused or threatened the victim. State v. Doan, No. CA97-12-014, 2000 WL 221963 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2000). Doan filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court in August 2000. Doan had a state postconviction proceeding pending at the time, but because of the Ohio courts’ delay in acting on the petition, the federal district court excused Doan from exhausting the claims that had not been exhausted in Doan’s direct appeal, including claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court denied Doan’s habeas petition, which alleged thirteen grounds for relief, but granted Doan a certificate of appealability as to whether the State violated his rights under Brady. Doan v. Voorhies, No. 1:00-CV-727, 2007 WL 894559 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007). This Court expanded the certificate of appealability to include Doan’s claims that the trial court violated his due process rights with a jury instruction that allegedly reduced the State’s burden of proof, and that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting inadmissible hearsay testimony. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner (Nov. 26, 2008)(Appeal from N.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0429p-06.pdf
-  Plaintiffs-appellees League of Women Voters of Ohio, League of Women Voters Toledo-Lucas County, and individual registered voters in Ohio allege that Ohio’s voting system is so deficient as to deny or severely burden their fundamental right to vote. They brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against defendants-appellants the Secretary of State of Ohio and the Governor of Ohio,1 alleging violations of equal protection, substantive due process, procedural due process, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”). Intervenor-appellee Jeanne White alleges that touchscreen voting machines utilized in Ohio violate her constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. The district court dismissed the HAVA claim but allowed the parties to proceed on their constitutional claims. We agree that the plaintiffs and intervenor have pled sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to their equal protection and substantive due process claims, but we find that the plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would establish a violation of procedural due process, if proven. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
       

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

USA v. Gilpatrick (Nov. 26, 2008)(Appeal from M.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0430p-06.pdf
-  Defendant Michael Gilpatrick appeals the 108-month sentence imposed by the district court following his jury conviction for conspiring to deprive another of his civil rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, and the substantive count of depriving another of his civil rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. Gilpatrick does not appeal his conviction. Gilpatrick argues that the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose a twenty-four month community corrections sentence, erred in increasing Gilpatrick’s offense level by two because of its finding that Gilpatrick obstructed justice, and erred by increasing the offense level by four because of its finding that Gilpatrick was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity. Consistent with the other circuits that have addressed the question, we hold that district courts retain the power to impose community corrections sentences and affirm the sentence of the district court in its entirety.

Robert Golden v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (Nov. 26, 2008)(Appeal from Internal Revenue)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0431p-06.pdf
-  Taxpayers Robert and Judith Golden appeal from two orders of the Tax Court sustaining the determination of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Appeals Officer, which denied the Goldens relief from the IRS’s proposed collection action. The underlying tax dispute, the merits of which are not before us, involved deductions and credits the Goldens claimed on their income-tax returns in the 1970s and early 1980s. In 1990, after the IRS issued a notice of deficiency for these tax years, the Goldens sought review in the Tax Court, and a stipulated decision was entered in 1994. The current litigation stems from the IRS’s proposed levy action to collect on these deficiencies. After a collection due-process hearing, the Appeals Officer upheld the proposed levy action, and the Goldens petitioned for review in the Tax Court. The Goldens now appeal the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner, which sustained the Appeals Officer’s determination that the levy action was not time-barred. The Goldens’ primary argument on appeal is that the Tax Court erred in finding that the Goldens were precluded by res judicata from challenging the timeliness of the assessment. Additionally, Mrs. Golden appeals the Tax Court’s decision, reached after a trial, denying her innocent-spouse relief under Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6015 (26 U.S.C. § 6015). For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the Tax Court’s orders sustaining the determination of the IRS Appeals Officer.