Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 , 2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , 2010 , 2011.

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Dec. 26th, 2008

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Sentencing
- Procedure / Rules
- Zoning
- Tort Miscellaneous
- Sufficiency / Evidence
- Automobiles / Criminal / Arrest
- Constitutional Law / Criminal / Procedure / Rules
- Jurisdiction / Venue
- Insurance
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

State v. Bowsher (Slip Opinion)(Dec. 24, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6692)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-ohio-6692.pdf
-  Judgment of the court of appeals reversed and cause remanded.
t reversed in part on the authority of In re Santrucek.

In re J.H. (Slip Opinion)(Dec. 24, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6697)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-ohio-6697.pdf
-  Discretionary appeal accepted and judgment of the court of appeals reversed on the authority of In re T.R.
 

First District Court of Appeals

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State v. Roberts (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6827)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6827.pdf
-  Under R.C. 5120.032, if a prisoner’s sentencing entry is silent on placement in an intensive program prison, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections must provide notice and seek approval from the court that imposed the stated prison term and journalized the sentencing entry, or from its duly designated successor court, before enrolling an otherwise eligible prisoner in the program. The trial court did not err in resentencing a defendant who had successfully completed a placement in an intensive program prison and been released from confinement, when the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections did not comply with the applicable statutes and its own rules and regulations in seeking approval for the placement by, among other things, failing to send the required notice to one of the common pleas judges who had actually participated in the defendant’s original sentencing. [But, see, DISSENT: Because the defendant had served his prison term, the trial court lacked the authority to resentence him; even though there may have been a technical error in providing notice of the defendant’s placement in the intensive program prison, the government made a promise, the defendant did exactly what was asked of him in reliance on that promise, and in equity, the government should be estopped from breaking its promise and sending the defendant back to prison.]
 
Walker v. Hodge (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6828)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6828.pdf
-  A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claims; “portions of the record” means only those evidentiary materials listed in Civ.R. 56(C) or 56(E). Civ.R. 56(E) permits material not identified in Civ.R. 56(C), such as complaints and judgment entries, and transcript excerpts from a separate action, to be used to support or oppose a summary-judgment motion, but only if they are properly authenticated and referred to in a properly framed affidavit. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are authorized by Civ.R. 52 when questions of fact are tried by the court; but because summary judgment assumes that genuine issues of material fact are not in dispute, findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Civ.R. 52, and summary judgment, pursuant to Civ.R. 56, are incompatible. When a trial court makes findings of fact in a case, the court has weighed the evidence and resolved issues of fact; both actions are inconsistent with the mandate of Civ.R. 56(C) because the purpose of summary judgment is not to try issues of fact, but rather to determine whether triable issues of fact exist. The trial court erred by entering summary judgment for the defendant in an action to recover medical costs arising from an automobile accident, when the exhibits upon which the defendant relied either were not made part of the record or were not in a form that could properly be considered in ruling on the defendant’s motion.
 
Monfort Supply Co. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6829)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6897.pdf
-  The Hamilton County Board of Zoning Appeals was without authority to deny the plaintiff’s application for a compatible nonconforming-use certificate, where the Board lacked a quorum to hear and rule on the application. A deemer provision in the county zoning resolution, which called for a decision in the applicant’s favor if the board did not render its own decision within a specified period of time, did not take effect where the applicant had agreed to extend the time for a decision.
 
Myrick v. Cincinnati (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6830)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6830.pdf
-  The trial court erred by overruling a city’s motion to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) when the factual allegations of the complaint were not sufficient to invoke an exception to the immunity granted to the city and its employees under R.C. Chapter 2744: In response to a child abduction, the city’s 911 dispatchers’ communications with the plaintiff were not reckless or wanton as a matter of law, when the dispatchers informed the plaintiff, as she was following her estranged husband and the child, to stop her car to speak to a police officer or to return to her home, where police officers were waiting, to receive assistance. [But, see, DISSENT: The complaint alleged facts indicating that the 911 dispatchers had been reckless and wanton in their communications with the plaintiff by conditioning police assistance on the plaintiff returning to her home even though the plaintiff had informed them of the current location of herself, her estranged husband, and her kidnapped child.]
 
State v. Barnes (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6831)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6831.pdf
-  Any error by the trial court in allowing problematic testimony was cured by later, competent evidence on the same topic, and the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s motion for an acquittal where reasonable minds could have found every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. [But see DISSENT: the trial court’ judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.]
 
Cincinnati v. Carroll (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6832)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6832.pdf
-  In a prosecution for a violation of R.C. 4511.19(B)(3), the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence against him: there was probable cause to arrest for an underage DUI where the 18-year old defendant, who had been stopped for speeding, smelled of alcohol, had watery and bloodshot eyes, and admitted to drinking alcohol; common sense plays an important and legitimate role in assessing probable cause in an underage drinking case, given that the prohibited per se limit is so minimal.
 
State v. Love (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6833)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6833.pdf
-  The trial court erred in dismissing an indictment for four counts of rape after this court had granted a new trial based on newly discovered alibi evidence: The stipulation after remand that the defendant had been out of the country during a portion of the time during which the victim had alleged that the offenses had occurred did not render the jury’s guilty verdicts erroneous, because the jury had not found that the offenses had occurred on a specific date, and there was the possibility that the victim had merely been mistaken or confused about the timing of the offenses; accordingly, the stipulation did not give rise to a constructive acquittal that would have prevented a retrial of the offenses on double-jeopardy grounds. The stipulated inability of the state to prove that the offenses had occurred during a certain period of time encompassed by the indictment was not a proper basis for dismissal under Crim.R. 12: The asserted basis for the dismissal required the examination of evidence beyond the face of the indictment, and the issue could not have been determined without a trial. The state properly amended the bill of particulars to state that the alleged offenses had not occurred during the time covered by the stipulation that the defendant had been out of the country: Under Crim.R. 7(D), the amendment did not change the name or the identity of the crimes charged, and the defendant did not demonstrate that he had been unduly prejudiced or misled by the amendment.
 
Natl. City Commercial Capital Co., L.L.C. v. FOC Financial Ltd. Partnership (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6834)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6834.pdf
-  An Arizona company was not transacting business in Ohio within the meaning of the long-arm statute simply because it had an interest in the proceeds of a certificate of deposit that happened to be located in an Ohio bank, but that otherwise arose from a financing deal for a Texas golf course; therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint for want of personal jurisdiction. An Ohio court’s assertion of jurisdiction over an Arizona company would have violated due process because the company had no relationship with Ohio but for its interest in the proceeds of a certificate of deposit located in an Ohio bank, and because the company had not availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Ohio or invoking the benefits and protections of Ohio law.
 
State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Dec. 26, 2008)(2008-Ohio-6835)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2008/2008-ohio-6835.pdf
-  The trial court correctly declared that two insurers that had similar “other insurance” clauses in their policies owed underinsured-motorist coverage on a pro-rata basis, but the court erred in determining the pro-rata shares.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

No Opinions.
      

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

No Opinions.