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Daily Case Update Archive
As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the
Ohio Supreme Court, the
Ohio State First District
Court of Appeals, and the United
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Feb. 2nd - 4th, 2009
Ohio Supreme Court
| Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio |
U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
TOPICS:
- Unauthorized practice of law
- Contracts / Mortgages / Residential mortgage loan agreement
- Writ of mandamus / Disability-retirement benefits
- Habeas corpus
- Criminal law / Witness intimidation
- Lis pendens / Multiple-defendant action involving property
- Criminal law / Right to counsel waived
- Criminal law / Sixth Amendment / Opportunity to cross-examine
- Criminal law — Extraterritorial traffic stop
- Attorney misconduct
- Juvenile / Violation Community control
- Appellate procedure / Notice of appeal filed with clerk
- Divorce / Pension division / Coverture formula
- Domestic-violence statute / Evidence / Sufficiency / Manifest weight
- Declaratory Judgment Act / Tax Injunction Act
- Withdrawal of Guilty Plea / Sentence Reasonableness
- Petition for Rehearing denied / Contract dispute
- United States Sentencing Guidelines / Career offender
- Clean Water Act
- EVidence / Spoliation sanctions
- IRS / Civil investigation / Suppress evidence
- Ohio Supreme Court
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Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Boyd (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3,
2009)(2009-ohio-305)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-305.pdf
- Unauthorized practice of law — Injunctive relief and civil
penalties.
Wilborn v. Bank One Corp. (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3, 2009)(2009-ohio-306)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-306.pdf
- Contracts — Mortgages — Residential mortgage loan agreement —
Provision requiring defaulting borrower to pay lender’s reasonable attorney
fees as condition for terminating foreclosure proceedings and reinstating
loan is not against public policy or statutory or decisional law.
State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys. (Slip
Opinion)(Feb. 3, 2009)(2009-ohio-307)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-307.pdf
- Appeal from court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus to
compel SERS to vacate its decision denying disability-retirement benefits —
Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.
Briseno v. Cook (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3, 2009)(2009-ohio-308)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-308.pdf
- Habeas corpus — Writ not available when petitioner had adequate
remedy by way of direct appeal — Writ denied.
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Jackim (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3,
2009)(2009-ohio-309)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-309.pdf
- Unauthorized practice of law — Preparing and filing a document on
behalf of another — Further violations enjoined — No civil penalty imposed.
State v. Malone (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3, 2009)(2009-ohio-310)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-310.pdf
- Criminal law — Witness intimidation — A conviction for witness
intimidation under R.C. 2921.04(B) is not sustainable when the intimidation
occurred after the criminal act but prior to any proceedings flowing from
the act in court.
Beneficial Ohio, Inc. v. Ellis (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 3,
2009)(2009-ohio-311)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-311.pdf
- Former R.C. 2703.26 — Lis pendens — Multiple-defendant action
involving property — Under former R.C. 2703.26, a person who seeks to
acquire an interest in property is charged with notice of a pending action
regarding the property when any defendant to the action is served with
summons.
State v. Thompson (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)(2009-ohio-314)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-314.pdf
- Criminal law — Penalty enhancements under R.C. 4511.19 — Defendant
must present prima facie case that prior convictions were unconstitutional
before burden shifts to state to show that right to counsel was properly
waived — Judgment reversed.
State v. Pasqualone (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-315.pdf
- Criminal law — Sixth Amendment — R.C. 2925.51 — Attorney may waive a
client’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation — When the state has
complied with its obligations under R.C. 2925.51, a defendant’s failure to
use the procedures of R.C. 2925.51(C) to demand that a laboratory analyst
testify constitutes a waiver of the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst
at trial and allows the analyst’s report to be admitted as prima facie
evidence of the test results.
State v. Jones (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)(2009-ohio-316)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-316.pdf
- Criminal law — Extraterritorial traffic stop — A law-enforcement
officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside the
officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a
traffic stop; the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)(2009-ohio-317)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-317.pdf
- Attorney misconduct — Engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, or misrepresentation — Engaging in conduct that adversely
reflects on fitness to practice law — Practicing law while employed as a
magistrate — Indefinite suspension.
In re J.F. (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)(2009-ohio-318)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-318.pdf
- A court may order a juvenile to serve a previously suspended
commitment after probation supervision has been terminated when the juvenile
violates a separate, unexpired condition of community control.
Louden v. A.O. Smith Corp. (Slip Opinion)(Feb. 4, 2009)(2009-ohio-319)
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http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-319.pdf
- Appellate procedure — Notice of appeal — Electronic filing — Unless
local rule expressly permits electronic filing of notice of appeal, paper
copy of notice of appeal must be filed with clerk of trial court pursuant to
App.R. 3.
- First District Court of Appeals
- [Search Other Ohio Districts]
*** Judgment Entries ***
Kathryn Streicher vs. Thomas H. Streicher (Feb. 4, 2009)
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http://www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080395_02042009.pdf
- Kathryn Streicher and defendant-appellee Thomas Streicher were
married in July 1976 and divorced in March 2001. The trial court concluded
that the parties had unambiguously agreed to divide the accumulated benefits
of the deferred-compensation and pension funds from July 3, 1976, to October
1, 1998. Kathryn contests that determination, arguing that the parties had
agreed to use the coverture method of valuation found in R.C. 3105.82(D),
and that the language in the agreed entry should have been interpreted to
reflect the parties’ intent. Not so—the language used in the divorce decree
and the agreed entry of property division cannot be reasonably interpreted
to support Kathryn’s argument. Because the language is plain and
unambiguous, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. In her appeal,
Kathryn advances the following assignments of error: the trial court erred
(1) in denying her motion for contempt and in failing to construe the
language of the parties’ divorce decree in a manner consistent with the
special meaning that the parties attached to the words contained in the
decree; (2) in failing to find ambiguity in the divorce decree; and (3) in
distributing the parties’ assets in an inequitable manner that was contrary
to the divorce decree. Judgment AFFIRMED.
State of Ohio vs. William E. Jones (Feb. 4, 2009)
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http://www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt/docs/decisions/C-080144_02042009.pdf
- Jones appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court
convicting him of domestic violence. Jones now argues that the conviction
was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Judgment AFFIRMED.
- U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ohio Cases
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Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Richard Levin (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from S.D.
OH)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0036p-06.pdf
- Plaintiffs, in-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers
that market and sell natural gas to Ohio consumers and one of their Ohio
customers, sued Ohio’s Tax Commissioner, Richard Levin. They alleged that
Ohio’s tax scheme is discriminatory and thus unconstitutional under either
the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause because four local natural
gas distribution companies benefit from certain tax exemptions and
exclusions that they do not benefit from, despite their similar situations.
But the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that, while the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, did not bar plaintiffs’ claims, general principles of
comity and federalism did. This latter conclusion was incorrect, and we
therefore reverse and remand.
USA v. Stephanie Woods (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from S.D. OH)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0037p-06.pdf
- Stephanie Woods pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money
laundering arising out of a mortgage fraud scheme and willful failure to
file income tax returns. The district court judge sentenced Woods to 30
months’ imprisonment on the money laundering count (Count One) and 12
months’ imprisonment for the tax counts (Counts Two through Six) to be
served concurrently. On appeal, Woods argues that: (1) she was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her plea agreement resulted from
coercion or undue influence; and (2) her sentence is unreasonable. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
- U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases
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Robert Langley v. Prudential Mortgage Capital Co (Feb. 3, 2009) (Appeal
from E.D. KY)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0033p-06.pdf
- The petition for rehearing is denied. The district court’s order
below was explicitly based in part on the invalidity of the forum selection
clause. As explained in the per curiam opinion, that analysis was not
correct, and the preliminary injunctive relief based on that analysis was
therefore reversed. Rehearing is accordingly not warranted.
USA v. Malik Hawkins (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from E.D. KY)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0034p-06.pdf
- On May 3, 2007, a grand jury issued an indictment alleging that
defendant Hawkins had conspired to distribute and had distributed quantities
of powder and crack cocaine. At the time of the indictment, Hawkins had two
prior felony convictions, one of which was for possession of an unregistered
firearm. Hawkins entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to conspiring to
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and reserving the
right to appeal the court's potential classification of him as a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Prior to sentencing, he filed an objection
in which he argued that his conviction for possession of an unregistered
firearm was not a “crime of violence” within U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. J.A. at 67.
Relying on the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and rulings from our sister
circuits, the district court overruled Hawkins’ objection and applied the
career offender enhancement, sentencing Hawkins to two hundred sixty-two
(262) months of imprisonment. Hawkins timely appealed the career offender
enhancement.
USA v. Cundiff (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from W.D. KY)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0035p-06.pdf
- After eight years of failed negotiations and ignored orders, the
United States sued George Rudy Cundiff (who goes by Rudy) and his son,
Christopher Seth Cundiff (who goes by Seth), seeking injunctive relief and
civil penalties against them for discharging “pollutants” into “waters of
the United States” without a permit in violation of the Clean Water Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1362. The district court granted summary judgment for the
governmeimposed injunctive relief in the form of a restoration plan for the
Cundiffs’ wetlands, and imposed a civil penalty of $225,000. All but $25,000
of that penalty was suspended, however, provided that the Cundiffs
implemented the restoration plan. The district court also dismissed the
Cundiffs’ array of statutory, common law, and constitutional counterclaims.
While the original appeal in this case was pending, the Supreme Court issued
its splintered ruling in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006),
which defined the Act’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.” In
light of Rapanos, we returned the case to the district court to reconsider
whether jurisdiction was proper over the Cundiffs’ wetlands. The district
court determined that it was because the Cundiffs’ wetlands were in fact
waters of the United States, and the Cundiffs appealed. We affirm the
district court on all grounds.
Adkins v. Wolever (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from W.D. MI)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0038p-06.pdf
- We reheard this case en banc to resolve a choice-of-law question:
Does state law control a federal court’s imposition of sanctions as relief
for spoliated evidence? The original panel, constrained by our earlier
opinions that applied state law to determine whether spoliation sanctions
were available, (see, e.g., Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 641 (6th Cir. 2004);
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 804 (6th Cir.
1999); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1988)),
affirmed the district court’s denial of sanctions because applicable state
law did not provide for sanctions based on third-party spoliation. Adkins v.
Wolever, 520 F.3d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Salmi v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)). We granted rehearing en
banc to bring our case law in line with other courts of appeals. We now
recognize—as does every other federal court of appeals to have addressed the
question—that a federal court’s inherent powers include broad discretion to
craft proper sanctions for spoliated evidence. To the extent that our
earlier opinions held otherwise, we overrule them. Accordingly, we VACATE
the judgment of the district court and REMAND for consideration of what, if
any, spoliation sanctions are appropriate in this case. If the district
court determines that sanctions are warranted under federal law, it must
also decide whether the earlier denial of spoliation sanctions is ground for
granting Adkins a new trial or was instead harmless error. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 61.
USA v. Jon Rutherford AND
USA v. Judith Bugaiski (Feb. 4, 2009) (Appeal from E.D. MI)
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http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0039p-06.pdf
- Defendants Jon Rutherford and Judith Bugaiski were charged with
numerous tax violations and conspiracy to defraud investigators from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The United States appeals the district
court’s suppression of certain statements and documents obtained pursuant to
an allegedly improper civil investigation. In short, though government
misconduct is regrettable, whether engaged in deliberately or, as here,
merely negligently, the misconduct at issue in this case simply does not
“shock[] the conscience.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). If
a remedy does exist, it is not one this court may impose by application of
the exclusionary rule. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s pre-trial
motion suppressing statements and documents and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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