Daily Case Update Archive

As a service to our members, we monitor opinions issued from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio State First District Court of Appeals, and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  You can read the latest summaries or archived summaries from 2005 or 2006.

If you would like to receive a daily e-mail with same-day case updates, please join our Members-Only discussion list.  Not a member?  Join today!

March 26th & 27th, 2009

Ohio Supreme Court | Ohio First District | U.S. 6th Circuit - Ohio | U.S. 6th Circuit - Other States
 

TOPICS:
- Writs / Criminal Miscellaneous
- Indictment / Complaint
- Sex offenses
- Child Custody
- Search and Seizure
- Bankruptcy / Bank to Bank transfers / Earmark Doctrine
- Motion to dismiss
- Videoconferencing / Parole determination proceedings in person
- Employment / Civil Rights Act
- Social Security benefits
 

Ohio Supreme Court

 

No Opinions.
 

First District Court of Appeals

[Search Other Ohio Districts]
 
Floyd v. Leis (March 27, 2009)(2009-Ohio-1369)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2009/2009-ohio-1369.pdf
-  An incarcerated defendant awaiting trial on criminal charges is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, when there is no showing that his bond has been set in an excessive amount: The fact that the trial court raised the bond upon the state’s motion is not enough to justify the issuance of a writ; and because the entry setting the bond is silent with respect to any conditions, the bond cannot be construed as an unlawful “cash only” bond, and the defendant may post the bond in any manner allowed under Crim.R. 46. Writ DENIED.

State v. Morgan (March 27, 2009)(2009-Ohio-1370)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2009/2009-ohio-1370.pdf
-  The defendant, by his guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping, waived his claim on appeal that his indictment had been defective in failing to allege the culpable mental state for each offense: his guilty pleas were a complete admission of his guilt, limited him to challenging only their voluntary, knowing, and intelligent nature, and precluded him from raising independent claims relating to any deprivation of constitutional rights that had occurred prior to their entry. State v. Shugars, 165 Ohio App.3d 379, 2006-Ohio-718, 846 N.E.2d 592, is overruled to the extent that it held that a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to try a defendant on any count of an indictment that is defective because it fails to allege a culpable mental state. [But, see, DISSENT: A defendant cannot, by pleading guilty to an indictment that does not charge an offense, magically convert the non-offense into an offense.] Judgment AFFIRMED.

State v. Bloom (March 27, 2009)(2009-Ohio-1371)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2009/2009-ohio-1371.pdf
-  The trial court erred in finding that the defendant was subject to classification and registration as a sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950 as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”): A violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) that occurred prior to January 1, 2008, the effective date of Senate Bill 10, is not a sexually oriented offense; and Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration provisions did not apply to the defendant because he had committed and pleaded guilty to a violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) when it was not a sexually oriented offense subject to registration. Judgment AFFIRMED in Part, REVERSED in Part, and Cause REMANDED.

In re Kruthaupt (March 27, 2009)(2009-Ohio-1372)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2009/2009-ohio-1372.pdf
-  In a child-custody case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in approving the magistrate’s decision that the child’s mother should maintain custody: the magistrate properly considered the potential effect of the disruption of the child’s living situation when considering his best interests, and the similarity of the magistrate’s language in this regard to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) did not, standing alone, demonstrate that the magistrate had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the father. The juvenile court abused its discretion in approving the magistrate’s decision concerning child visitation to the extent that the decision did not order overnight visits: the parties agreed that overnight visits wer AFFIRMED in Part, REVERSED in Part, and Cause REMANDED.

State v. Garmon (March 27, 2009)(2009-Ohio-1373)
-  http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/1/2009/2009-ohio-1373.pdf
-  The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress his arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol: the arresting officer had neither observed defendant operating the vehicle nor found the car keys on defendant; but those facts were not, as the trial court had mistakenly found, dispositive of the issue of probable cause; and under the totality of the facts and circumstances, which demonstrated a contemporaneous relationship between defendant’s admitted operation of the vehicle and his admitted intoxication, , the police officer had probable cause to arrest him for OVI. Judgment REVERSED and Cause REMANDED.
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  Ohio Cases

 

MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Louis Yoppolo (March 27, 2009) (Appeal from N.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0118p-06.pdf
-  In this appeal we are asked to decide whether the bankruptcy court erred by holding that a certain bank-to-bank transfer of funds was a preference within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 547. Because we conclude that the transfer in fact diminished the debtor’s assets and the “earmark” doctrine does not apply, and therefore the transfer was of an interest of the debtor in the property, we affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court.

USA v. Funk (March 27, 2009) (Appeal from N.D. OH)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0120p-06.pdf
-  This matter now comes before the court upon the motion of the appellant United States, to which motion the appellee has not objected, to dismiss the appeal with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 42(b).
 

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Other States Cases

 

Sammy Terrell v. USA (March 26, 2009) (Appeal from E.D. MI)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0116p-06.pdf
-  This case presents the federal courts of appeals with an issue of first impression. Can the United States Parole Commission (“Commission”) use videoconferencing to conduct parole determination proceedings? Habeas petitioner Sammy Terrell challenged this practice as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(e) and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and he prevailed in the district court on due process grounds. We conclude that the statute requires parole determination proceedings to be held in person, and so for the following reasons, affirm the judgment of the district court.

Sharon Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. (March 26, 2009) (Appeal from M.D. TN)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0117p-06.pdf
-  Sharon Turnbull Sybrandt sued her former employer, Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., alleging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) by terminating her employment because of her sex. Home Depot filed a motion for summary judgment,arguing that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Sybrandt based upon her violation of a company policy that prohibited the use of an employee’s password-protected user-identification code to conduct personal transactions involving Home Depot merchandise. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Home Depot.

Almon Allen v. Commissioner of Social Security (March 27, 2009) (Appeal from W.D. KY)
-  http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0119p-06.pdf
-  Almon Dale Allen applied for and was denied social security benefits for the period ending September 11, 2006. While attempting to reopen this initial case, Allen filed a new benefits application and the Social Security Administration granted Allen benefits beginning September 12, 2006. Allen now appeals the denial of first application, claiming that the initial administrative law judge violated agency procedural regulations by failing to on of his treating physician. Alternatively, Allen argues that the subsequent favorable determination serves as new, material evidence in the initial decision requiring a remand to the agency. Because the ALJ properly followed the Social Security Administration’s regulations, and because the subsequent favorable decision, on its own, is not new and material evidence, we affirm the district court’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Allen’s initial benefits request.
 

Daily Case Updates